

To all
Mr. E. Reid
Mr. Angus
Mr. Stewart
Mr. Horner
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]



RECORDS
File No. 6209-40
Sub. Chron. Filed

No. 20.

CHUNGKING, China,
January 8, 1944.

Sir:

The interesting statement that "Tibetans are solidly behind the Central Government (of China) in the war of resistance" has just been made to the Central News Agency, in a special interview, by a representative of the "Living Buddha" of Labrang. A copy of the report of the interview I have the honour to transmit herewith. Labrang covers a large area in the Chinese provinces of Chinghai, Kansu, Szechuan and Sikang. It does not cover any part of Tibet, nor are the people concerned Tibetans. It is true that the leader who talked with the Central News, "Command" Huang Cheng-ching as they call him, claimed that the Chiamuyang "Living Buddha" had visited parts of Tibet and the "border region" to preach the importance of the war of resistance, and had obtained good results.

2. The problem of Tibet is a most interesting one, and one to which I would like to have an opportunity to give some study. The Chinese do not see that the attempt to compel the Tibetans to allow themselves and their country to be incorporated as an integral part of China is most definitely an act of aggression. On several occasions when the position of the British in India has been under discussion, I have switched to the subject of Tibet. My Chinese friends immediately have said, "Oh, that's different!" And they cannot understand my obtuseness in persisting that there are some elements in the two cases which are very parallel. They have taught themselves that China is a peace loving country and that, being a peace loving country, none of her acts can be acts of aggression. Britain, on the other hand, is Imperialistic, and the essence of Imperialism is aggression. This is not a pose. It is a conviction, -- almost an obsession. The peacefulness of China, the industry of China, the honour of China, the philosophy of China, the kindness of China, the scholarship of China, the art of China, are all things in which the educated Chinese ardently believe. The humble farmer and the coolie know nothing of any of them. These two classes just see the rice bowl, sometimes filled, sometimes empty, most often only partly filled.

3. Peaceful as China believes herself to be, there is no doubt that official China is determined to "swallow" Sinkiang, Tibet, Outer Mongolia, Kansu and Sikang, no matter what the people living in those regions may feel about the matter. The Chinese attitude is probably as fixed as, and very similar to, that of Canadians when they think of the Indians and the Esquimo in the far north. And, as such, it is quite understandable.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
W. L. Mackenzie King
Canadian Minister.

Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Department of External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Canada.

Encl.

6209	40	SECRET
24	56	

Ottawa, March 7, 1949

Dear Mr. Kearney,

I have read with attention your despatch No. 69 of February 10, discussing the case of Communist infiltration into Tibet, Nepal and Sikkim.

2. I confess that the report of Communist influences upon the Lamaseries of Tibet is surprising. In view, however, of the United States Ambassador's partial corroboration of this report, I should think there must be some substance to it, particularly since Mr. Henderson has recently paid a visit to Nepal. It will, therefore, be greatly appreciated if you will continue to report to us on any further information you may obtain regarding Communist activities in Tibet. Our Mission in China has never been a very good source of information about Tibet. This is attributable to the fact that Chinese officials who go to Tibet are not concerned, on their return, in reporting accurately on political developments in that country. The Tibetans who have reached Chungking and Nanking have come from the Chinese Provinces of Chinghai and Sikang and have been either in no position or of no mind to report on political developments within Tibet proper.

3. Inner Tibet, the domain of the Dalai Lamas, which is ruled by priests and completely pervaded by religious influence, is certainly no natural exercising-ground for Communism. The lamas and nobles, whose grip upon the country has so far, I believe, not been loosened, would properly have no compunction about taking forceful steps to suppress the growth of an idea which would threaten the foundation of their absolute

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J. D. Kearney, Esq., K.C.,
High Commissioner for Canada,
NEW DELHI, India.

power. The uneducated peasants and herdsmen, quite ignorant of the outside world, and, therefore, indifferent to progress, are likely to remain content, provided they are left in peace to tend to their land and herds and to carry out their religious practices. Lamaism induces an attitude of placid acceptance of things as they are, I think that even the peasants would tend to look suspiciously upon any teaching which might upset established religious beliefs.

4. I imagine, however, that in outer Tibet, which merges with the Chinese provinces of Chinghai and Sikang, disturbing elements may be at work. Communist influenced Mongols may have penetrated Northern Tibet, which is partially Mongol-inhabited. The Mongols, however, being nomadic, do not usually make particularly good disciples of Marx. Nevertheless, there may be dissatisfied bands stirring up trouble, in an attempt to make the monasteries disgorge some of their wealth. Most of the Tibetan Mongols are concentrated in the province of Chinghai, which the Chinese carved out of North East Tibet. There the religious power is centred in the great monastery at Kumbun, headed by the Panchen Lama. The present Panchen Lama is pretty closely under the thumb of General Ma Fu-fang, Chinese Moslem (Tungan) Governor of Chinghai. It has not yet become clear what attitude the Chinese Moslems will adopt towards their Communist compatriots.

5. The report of Mongol-Communist infiltration may have reference to Mongolians studying Lamaism as students and novices in Tibetan monasteries. In 1920 there were as many as 800 students from Mongolia in Tibetan lamaseries. At that time a strong cultural bond existed between Tibet and Mongolia. Relations have become less cordial, however, since the Soviet Union gained predominant influence over Outer Mongolia and began to discourage Lamaism in that country. Nevertheless, a certain number of religious students from Outer Mongolia still come to Tibetan monasteries, as do some "Buriat Mongols" from the Trans-Baikal and Irkutsk regions in Siberia. It is thought that some of these students may in reality be agents, whose task it is both to spread the idea of Communism in Tibet and to take back reports about the state of the country, which has for long been well nigh inaccessible to outsiders. With the Abbots having affairs so well under control in Tibet, I doubt whether trouble-makers can achieve much headway yet. I should be glad, however, to have further information on this subject.

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6. Tibet is, of course, remote from Canada. Our interest in securing information about developments there is partly out of political curiosity, partly with a view to determining the pattern for the spread of Communist influence in Asia. We have taken the view that the Russian and Chinese Communists will, to some extent, be competing for immediate influence among the non-Chinese minorities within the extended boundaries of China. It has been our view that there is likely to be a certain competition between the two for control.

7. This has been a somewhat discursive letter, but has been written to indicate our appreciation for the information you have sent us.

Yours sincerely,

LEON MAYRAND

for the

Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

OFFICE OF THE

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

NEW DELHI, November 1, 1950.

No. 483

Sir:

In a recent despatch on Tibet I mentioned an interview which the Prime Minister gave to Reuters' chief diplomatic correspondent in Srinagar last weekend.

2. I enclose copies of a clipping from yesterday's Hindustan Times, which contains a report of the interview which took place in Srinagar on October 29. The Prime Minister is reported to have said that it was still not clear what the Chinese Government's real intentions are towards Tibet, and to have remarked that there are certain disputed areas in eastern Tibet where China had been given the right to station garrisons under the terms of former agreements.

3. The Prime Minister made two further points which throw light on his thinking about the invasion of Tibet as of the date of the interview. He said that the Chinese Government in Peking are filled with an unjustified apprehension that the United States is bent on destruction of the new régime in China. He also suggested that "the current Chinese policy" is perhaps partly attributable to the fact that, although Peking's policy might not be dictated by Moscow, much of the information upon which this policy is based comes through Soviet sources. He cited, for example, Moscow having repeatedly said that Anglo-U.S. "intrigues" in Tibet aim at bringing Tibet into an anti-Communist bloc or sphere of influence. The Prime Minister wondered whether these accusations, however unfounded they might be, might not have influenced the Chinese decision to move into Tibet.

4. Reuters' chief diplomatic correspondent is, I understand, Mr. Mangeau. Mr. Bridle met him in Lucknow where he was covering the I.P.R. Conference and again in Delhi where he spent some time after the conference ended. A week ago Mr. Mangeau went to Srinagar to spend about two weeks in Kashmir. He was in Srinagar when the Prime Minister arrived last week-end on his two-day visit and thus was in a position to obtain the interview reported in this despatch.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) Warwick Chipman,
High Commissioner.

The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
O t t a w a.

22

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, NEW DELHI, INDIA
 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

SECRET

CYPHER - O.T.P.

NO. 243

NEW DELHI, November 7, 1950.

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*Repeat to Done
 c.r.d.w. Nov 8/50
 W. J. M. G.
 Refer to
 U.S.S.R.
 not. Inf.
 Sec. of Cabinet*

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NOV 17 1950

*U.S.S.R.
 Defence Sec.
 European Div.
 Commonwealth Div.
 London
 Paris
 Moscow
 Tokyo
 Karachi*

Secret. My telegram No. 234 of October 31st, Tibet.

1. Indian Government are in communication with Lhasa but factual information available at External is still limited. They have had a report of Tibetan troops retreating from Pemba east of Shobando towards Lhasa, which would indicate Lhodzong and Shobando have fallen; also a report of a Chinese patrol has been discovered to westward in Rudok, south east of Leh.

2. Press report from Kalimpong, which may not be reliable, says three Communists columns have been operating from the east; that one has reached Gyantsa Dzong some 200 miles south west of Shobando and 90 miles east of Lhasa and that advance units are in Reting, 60 miles north east of the capital. These reports also suggest a 4th column is moving from Khotan in Sinkiang to approach Lhasa from the west.

3. According to press, the Dalai Lama has made an abortive effort to flee Lhasa, China has asked India to withdraw her small outposts from Gyantse and Yatung, and leader of Tibetan delegation has received no fresh instructions. External say Dalai Lama is in Lhasa with no present intentions of fleeing and that National Assembly is in emergency session there, that India has received no, repeat no, approach from China about her establishments in Tibet, and that Lhasa has instructed delegation not, repeat not, to proceed.

*E. W. Spear
 Done Nov. 10/50
 R. G.*

HIGH COMMISSIONER



OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

New Delhi, November 14, 1950

No. 494

SECRET

To Sec
~~Mr. [unclear]~~
~~Mr. [unclear]~~

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Refer to
u.s.s.e.
Chief of Staff
Legal Sec.
u.s. Div.
Refugees

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10/27 1950

E. W. [unclear]

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[unclear]

Sir:
During the past two weeks, in considering the Tibetan question, I have found it useful on occasion to consult a volume entitled "Tibetan Précis" by H.E. Richardson, which was printed by the Government of India Press and published in New Delhi in 1948. I understand this volume is classified as secret; at any rate, it is for official use only. The Private Secretary to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs has been kind enough to make the volume available to us and we are occasionally able to consult it in his office.

2. In addition to the terms of the Simla Convention, the volume contains a description of the negotiations leading up to the initialling of the Convention and of the aftermath. The greater part of the book is taken up with an account of the recent history of Tibet up to and including the last Great War.

3. Enclosed with the volume are a number of maps illustrating the text. From another source I have secured a copy of the first of these maps, which does not bear any security marking and which is the "map referred to in Article 9 of the Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet, dated, the 3rd July, 1914." I have made a tracing of the salient features of this map and enclose it herewith. The importance of the map lies in its delineation of the frontiers of Tibet (chiefly as between Tibet and China) and of the McMahon line which separates inner and outer Tibet, as understood in the Treaty. You will notice that the area referred to as inner Tibet is considerably narrower than the area shown on some other maps.


4. An interesting feature of the map, which I have not reproduced, is that at the top in the centre there are printed the words "(S.G.D.) A. Henry McMahon, British Plenipotentiary", under which is a square containing the word "seal". Also at the top and over to the left appear the words "Signature and seal of Tibetan Plenipotentiary" and a smaller square also containing the word "Seal." There is no reference to the Chinese Plenipotentiary, nor is there any square for his seal. I suppose that this means this copy of the map was one which was "initialled" by the British and Tibetan representatives (respectively representing India and Tibet) after the Chinese Government had refused to ratify the Treaty.

NOV 27 1950

The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

5. The terms of the Simla Convention are also, I understand, summarized in a Treaty Series known as "Aitcheson's Treaties". I think the Simla Convention is contained in Volume XIV or XV of the Series. The United Kingdom High Commission here have promised to lend me a copy of the relevant volume, but so far they have not been able to send it to me as it is evidently in fairly constant use.
6. If you do not already have access to either of these books, I would suggest that you might find them useful, particularly the "Tibetan Précis". In addition to the history, which helps to throw present developments into perspective, it contains some quite revealing passages outlining the arguments of various representatives when Tibetan affairs were under discussion, as well as extracts from statements in the British House of Commons, and so on.
7. Incidentally the author of "Tibetan Précis", Mr. H.E. Richardson, is the same Richardson who until recently was India's representative in Lhasa. A short time ago his place was taken by Mr. S. Sinha, an officer of the Ministry of External Affairs. Mr. Richardson who, of course, had represented India in Tibet under the British régime, is now on his way to India. When I last heard of his movements, he was in Gangtok. I understand that he is shortly to go on leave prior to retirement. I would not be surprised if he came to Delhi before going on leave.
8. At the moment I am unable to secure copies of either of the above volumes for you and I am doubtful if I will be able to do so, particularly in view of the "Tibetan Précis" being a classified document. It may be, however, that our High Commissioner in London might have access to the volumes.
9. I am sending copies of this despatch to our High Commissioners in London and Karachi.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,



High Commissioner

P.S. If you should be able to secure copies of the above volumes, I would be grateful if you would send me copies, if at all possible.

→ 7-19-2
X1200

OTTAWA FILE
No.....

Despatch No... 513.....

Date.... November 16th, 1950,....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FROM: The High Commissioner for Canada in India, New Delhi

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference..... Chinese invasion of Tibet.....

Subject:.....

I enclose a copy of a communication addressed to me by the Heads of the Tibetan Delegation in Kalimpong. This is the delegation that was about to proceed to Peking.

2. In connection with the Tibetan appeal to the United Nations, I may mention that Mr. Henderson, the United States Ambassador, recently gave a Press Conference in Calcutta. In the course of his remarks he used an expression which seemed to imply that the United States at the Security Council would take the line that the Council could not interfere. Subsequently, he clarified his remarks so as to leave this point open. I enclose newspaper clippings of his two statements.

3. I also observed in one of the newspapers yesterday some statements of Mr. Kenneth Younger which seemed to take the line that as China was recognized as a suzerain, the Security Council could not interfere. A communication in the newspapers this morning from Lake Success conveys a different impression.

4. I find it hard to see how the question of suzerainty comes into the matter. First of all the Chinese never ratified the agreement by which Chinese suzerainty but Tibetan autonomy were agreed to. In the second place even if it had been agreed to, suzerainty is hardly the same as sovereignty, particularly when autonomy is part of the bargain. In the third place, if China owned Tibet, there would be no point in having discussions with the Tibetans about mutual relations and certainly no point in sending an army to conquer it. The sending of an army is surely a confession that the matter is not domestic.

5. India may be in a special position, through being a party to the original Treaty, though even at that I should have thought some of the above considerations would apply; but the great majority of the membership of the United Nations are free from any such embarrassments.

(Sgd.) Warwick Chipman,
High Commissioner.

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Post File
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MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

FILE REF.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

REPEAT BY TELEGRAM TO LONDON No. 1811 ✓ SENT -- NOV 21 1950

Message To Be Sent	No. <u>EX-2368</u>	Date <u>21</u> November <u>20</u> , 1950	For Communications Office Use Only SENT -- NOV 21 1950
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER <i>aut</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
Degree of Priority			
ORIGINATOR	TIBET.		
Sig. <u>R.E. Collins/ed</u>	In view of the possibility that the problem of Tibet may be discussed in the United Nations, a memorandum on the international status of Tibet has been prepared in the Legal Division. A copy is being forwarded for your information by bag. The concluding paragraph reads as follows:		
Typed:	"The question is, should Canada consider Tibet to be an independent state, a vassal of China, or an integral portion of China. It is submitted that the Chinese claim to sovereignty over Tibet is not well founded. Chinese suzerainty, perhaps existent, though ill-defined, before 1911, appears since then, on the basis of facts available to us, to have been a mere fiction. In fact, it appears that during the past 40 years Tibet has controlled its own internal and external affairs. Viewing the situation thus, I am of the opinion that Tibet is, from the point of view of international law, qualified for recognition as an independent state."		
Div. <u>Am. & F.E. Div.</u>	2. It would be appreciated if you could obtain information on the U.S. (U.K.) view regarding the legal status of Tibet and its relationship to possible action in the United Nations.		
Local Tel. <u>2991</u>			
APPROVED BY			
Sig. <u>R. E. Collins</u>			
Typed:			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published			
Yes () No ()			
Internal Distribution	<p><i>Mr. Reid</i> <i>Legal Div</i> <i>U.N. Div</i> <i>ML</i></p>		
Done			
Date			
Copies Referred To:			
Done			
Date			

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

FILE REF.

50077-40

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK

Message To Be Sent	No. 322	Date 21 November 20, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only SENT -- NOV 21 1950
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER <i>auth</i>	X		
Degree of Priority			
ORIGINATOR	Your telegram No. 436 of November 18. Tibet.		
Sig. R.E. Collins/ed	1. We are forwarding by bag copies of a memorandum prepared in the Legal Division regarding the status of Tibet, the concluding paragraph of which reads as follows:		
Typed:	"The question is, should Canada consider Tibet to be an independent state, a vassal of China, or an integral portion of China. It is submitted that the Chinese claim to sovereignty over Tibet is not well founded. Chinese suzerainty, perhaps existent, though ill-defined, before 1911, appears since then, on the basis of facts available to us, to have been a mere fiction. In fact, it appears that during the past 40 years Tibet has controlled its own internal and external affairs. Viewing the situation thus, I am of the opinion that Tibet is, from the point of view of international law, qualified for recognition as an independent state."		
Div. Am. & F.E. Div.	2. We are requesting the Canadian High Commissioner's office in London and the Canadian Embassy in Washington to let us have any information they may be able to obtain regarding U.K. and U.S. views on this question.		
Local Tel. 2991			
APPROVED BY			
Sig. <i>R. E. Collins</i>			
Typed:			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published			
Yes () No ()			
Internal Distribution	<i>Mr Reid</i> <i>Legal Div</i> <i>V & Div</i> <i>RLH</i>		
Done			
Date			
Copies Referred To:			
Done			
Date			



SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

COPY NO. 45

CSC 7-2-1

DATE: 30 Nov 50

PAPER NO. 30(50)

SUBJECT

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TIBET

DISTRIBUTION

- No. 1 - CGS
- No. 2 - CAS
- No. 3 - CNS
- No. 4 - CDRB
- Nos. 5-14 - Secretary, Joint Planning Committee
- Nos. 15-29 - Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee
- Nos. 30-44 - Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee
- No. 45 - File

APPROVED BY
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

[Signature]
for Secretary.

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Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
JIS (706)
NO.....

COPY NO. 45


SECRET

OTTAWA, 6 October, 1950.

Chiefs of Staff Committee Paper No. 30(50)

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TIBET

141



[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

C.S.C. 30(50)

SECRET

JIS (706)

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF
TIBET

OBJECT

1. (a) To examine the strategic importance of Tibet.
- (b) To assess the possibility of communist aggression in Tibet and the methods by which it might take place.

Definition

2. Tibet, for the purpose of this paper, excludes Chinghai and Sikang.

Location. (See Figure 1)

3. Tibet is bounded on the north by Sinkiang, on the north-east by Chinghai, on the east by Sikang, on the west by Kashmir and on the south by India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

Accessibility

4. Land communications between Tibet and adjoining countries are poor because of the mountainous character of the borders.

5. Along the southern border of Tibet the routes from Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and India consist of tracks. A few can be used by pack animals; on the others portage is the only means of transport. They are liable to be blocked by snow for varying periods between September and June; the route from Kalimpong is the best in this respect, and is rarely blocked for more than a few months in the year.

6. Connections with China are as poor as those with southern Asia and follow high passes most of which are over 15,000 ft.

7. Connections can be made with Mongolia and Sinkiang by way of Hsi-ning, capital of Chinghai (Tsinghai). There is no direct route from Sinkiang across northern Tibet.

Geography

8. Tibet consists of lofty plateaux bounded on the north by the Kuen Lun and Altyn Tagh Mountains and on the south by the Himalaya Mountains. The area of the country is approximately 470,000 square miles.

9. Geographically Tibet may be divided into two areas:

- (a) The Northern Plateau (Chang-tang), extending from 80 to 92 degrees east longitude. This region has an elevation of 16,000 feet upward.
- (b) The valley of the Tsang-po River and its tributaries. (Chinghai and Sikang are cut into deep valleys by the Yangtze and several other rivers.)

10. On the Northern Plateau precipitation is light, probably about 3". The mean July temperature is about 40°F. but noon temperatures average about 70°F. The mean July temperature is approximately 0°F. with extremes as low as -40°F. Elsewhere summers are warmer, the winters are less rigorous and the precipitation is greater. At Lhasa the July mean is 62°F., the January mean 27°F., and the precipitation 10 to 20 inches.

POLITICAL FACTORS

Government Structure

11. The spiritual and temporal spheres of authority are combined in a theocracy under the Dalai Lama, who is believed by Tibetans to be a reincarnation of a Buddha and who resides in a monastery-palace in Lhasa. The administrative system is maintained chiefly through the local authority of the wide-spread monasteries, which are linked together by a common veneration for the person of the Dalai Lama. Senior administrative officials are drawn from the lay nobility and from the monasteries. Under the Dalai Lama's authority there is a Grand Council of three laymen and one monk, while there also exists a National Assembly attended by all high ecclesiastical and lay officials. This body is responsible for selecting a Regent during the minority of the Dalai Lama. A Regent is presently holding office in Tibet.

12. Ranking higher ecclesiastically than the Dalai Lama, and often competing with him for power, is the Panchen Lama but his actual authority in Tibet has traditionally been limited to the area around his own monastery at Shigatse. The present Panchen Lama, who is also a minor, has been living in the monastery of Kumbum in Chinghai. He has now been taken "under the protection" of the Chinese Communist authorities.

Stability of the Government

13. The administration of the Dalai Lama, although loose in structure, has great moral authority. Tibet has occasionally suffered from internal strife but the present regency, which was established in 1933 in a period of political disorganization following the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, has solidified its position during the ensuing years. The administration was able to put down a revolt by the powerful Sera Che Monastery in 1945-1947; this revolt is believed to have been fomented by the Chinese Resident in Lhasa. It is not considered that the present administration could be overthrown by any internal force without outside assistance.

14. In the eastern part of the country the hold of the Tibetan government is not so strong because of the lack of defined boundaries with the Chinese provinces of Chinghai and Sikang and because of the influence of the Panchen Lama, who has been living in that region during his minority under the domination first of the Chinese moslems and, more recently, of the Chinese communists. There have also been reports of activity by dissident nomad bands in this region.

Communism

15. It is considered that Communist ideas have not penetrated to any significant degree into the priestly state of Tibet, where even the peasant population would look with suspicion upon any teaching which would tend to upset the established order of things; an attack on the government would be regarded as an attack upon religion. There have been

reports, however, that Communist-influenced Mongols have penetrated into northern Tibet, which is partly inhabited by Mongols. The strong card held by the Chinese Communists is their tutelage over the young Panchen Lama, in whose name they have declared their readiness to "liberate" Tibet.

Morale

16. Tibetan leaders, rather unrealistically in view of the forces and material at their disposal, have asserted their determination to resist aggression from any quarter. It is possible that some Tibetan leaders hold a somewhat naive view of their ability to maintain the integrity and independence of Tibet, because of the tradition of Tibetan independence which has been preserved in the past by the inaccessibility of the country and the protective interest of the United Kingdom government. There have been reports recently that a weakening of resolution has occurred, in the face of threats of invasion and intensified pressure from communist China, and that a settlement by negotiation may not be impossible.

External Relations

17. China has claimed suzerainty over Tibet since 1751. However, the claim has, in effect, been only nominal and the country has maintained itself in isolation and autonomy for a considerable period. Tibet was able to maintain its autonomy before the Great War largely because of the desire of the United Kingdom government that Tibet should be maintained as a friendly buffer state between India and Russia.

18. In 1912, the new Chinese Republic reasserted the Chinese claim with the declaration that Tibet would, in the future, "come within the sphere of internal administration." This declaration was repudiated by the United Kingdom government which, while recognizing the suzerain right of China in Tibet, would not recognize the right of China to intervene actively in Tibet's internal administration. This position was reiterated to the Chinese Government by the United Kingdom Government in 1943. China and the United Kingdom were never able to reach formal accord over the status of Tibet.

19. Since granting independence to India, the United Kingdom interest in Tibet has become less direct. The Indian government, however, which maintains a representative in Lhasa, has followed the traditional United Kingdom policy of recognizing Chinese suzerainty, as long as there is no interference in internal Tibetan affairs, but has not shown the same firmness.

20. The Chinese claim will probably be pressed more vigorously by the Peking Government, whose leader has invited the Tibetans to become "members of the big family of unified, prosperous China", and intimated that the People's Liberation Army stands ready to facilitate the family's reunion. In the face of this invitation,

S E C R E T

Tibet appealed for aid to the United Kingdom, the United States and India and indicated its intention to send delegations to the United Kingdom and United States and to seek membership in the United Nations.

21. The United Kingdom discouraged the sending of a Tibetan mission and took the attitude that it was unrealistic for Tibet to attempt to gain entrance to the United Nations. The United Kingdom government indicated that its policy toward Tibet was unchanged but it could not hold out any hope of direct assistance.

22. It is understood that the United States government adopted a similar line to that of the United Kingdom.

23. India, not wishing to have a communist state upon its border, has a more direct concern in events in Tibet. The Indian government has intimated to the Peking government that Chinese action against Tibet would have an adverse effect upon Indian-Chinese relations. While it is not considered likely that the Indian government would be prepared to give much more than moral support to Tibet, if that country should be invaded by Chinese Communist forces, MAO Tse-tung might be restrained from taking forceful action by a desire to maintain good relations with India.

24. The Peking Government recently agreed to enter in discussions with the Tibetan Government about the future political status of Tibet. The Chinese representative is a newly appointed Ambassador to India and the Tibetan representatives are the members of a mission which the Tibetan Government despatched some time ago to try to forestall invasion by negotiating with Peking outside Chinese territory. The first stages of the discussion have been taking place in New Delhi and it was reported on 25 October, that the Tibetan delegation, on Chinese insistence, left for Peking to resume negotiations there about mid-November. If a settlement should ultimately be negotiated, it would presumably entail a retreat from the original Tibetan position since it is unlikely that Peking would be willing to accept Tibetan claims to what is in effect complete autonomy. It is possible that the conclusion of a settlement resulting in the loss of Tibetan autonomy would cause the Dalai Lama to retire to India. Recent reports of Chinese troop movements into Tibet have caused the Indian Government to make representations to the Peking Government expressing the concern of India, Burma and Nepal over the invasion reports and hoping that the negotiations would not be abandoned.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

25. Tibet's population is estimated at $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 million people. The inclusion of Chinghai and Sikang Provinces would increase it by 2 million. Of the 2 million Tibetan-speaking peoples the greatest concentration is in the Tsang-Po (Brahmaputra) River valley. Lhasa itself has an estimated 50,000 people. The balance of the population is made up of itinerant Mongols on pilgrimage to Lhasa; Chinese, Turkis, Bhutanese and Nepali traders who enjoy extra-territorial rights, and Ladakhi Moslems. There are probably not more than four occidentals - two British radio operators and two Austrian refugees.
26. Lama Buddhism is the predominant influence in Tibetan society with a sixth of the total male population in monastic orders. This theocratic dominance has resulted in a rigid social stratification, and although Lama Buddhism has given the people a gentle, kindly, happy-go-lucky philosophy it has undoubtedly stifled material progress. While nobles are more powerful than most Lama priests, the priesthood is the largest and most important class. It is strangely democratic in that monks of humble peasant origin may rise to positions of high ecclesiastic and thus state authority. The nobility is small, wealthy and composed of landed feudal lords and the relatives of present or previous Dalai and Panchen lamas. Nobles regard government service as an obligation for which the rewards are power and perquisite. Of the trading class many are of foreign origin. Tenant farmers comprise the majority of the peasant class. There are large numbers of nomads and equally numerous brigands, mutually indistinguishable.
27. The Tibetan economy is primarily pastoral and agricultural. Theocratic conservatism, geographic isolation and a hostile physical environment while promoting economic self-sufficiency have prevented any major economic development.
28. Animal products are Tibet's most important economic resource. Herds of yak, cattle, ponies and flocks of sheep and goats are grazed at altitudes above the cultivation line and provide wool, hides and butter, both for human consumption and for religious purposes, and dried yak dung is the universal fuel. Musk and deer horns are important wild animal products.
29. Cereals are grown in river valleys with an elevation of less than 14,000 feet. Barley is the chief crop but wheat and buckwheat grow at lower altitudes.
30. No adequate survey has been made of mineral resources but deposits of unascertained value have been discovered. Superstition and servile labour have seriously retarded the exploitation of these resources. Gold, silver, copper, iron, lead and sulphur are known to exist. (Chinghai Province produces 1500 tons of coal per annum. A petroleum survey by the Chinese government has discovered the presence of oil in undisclosed quantities in both Chinghai and Sikang Provinces.)
21. Tibet's manufactures are limited to an arsenal producing small arms and a British-equipped mint, both in Lhasa. (Sikang, which produces

SECRET

blankets, paper, pottery, wood alcohol and soda in small quantities, has an undeveloped hydro-electric potential.)

32. India acts as middleman in the trade of Tibet and accepts wool, yak tails, musk and hides in exchange for cotton goods, hardware, tobacco, rice and miscellaneous domestic articles. To China, Tibet exports gold dust, wool, furs, musk and deer horns (used medicinally). In exchange Tibet buys brick tea as well as fabrics and matches. It is significant that the overland trade route between China and Tibet is so poor and has been so bandit-ridden that the sea route via India has carried the bulk of the trade. Internal trade is done by barter. Owing to Tibet's favourable trade balance with India the rupee has become the standard of exchange.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

(See Figure 2)

33. The only method of travel in Tibet is by animal or foot. Tibet is connected with India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim by two main routes and several subsidiary routes. The main routes are as follows:

(a) The route from Gartok, in the extreme west of Tibet, via Leh to Srinagar in Kashmir. This route is passable throughout most of the year.

(b) The route from Gyantse via the Chumbi Valley to Kalimpong in Sikkim, and on to Darjeeling. For part of the way there are two alternate tracks, via the Natu and Jelep passes.

The routes into China are:

(c) A main route through Gyanda to Chiamdo which splits into two divisions:

- (i) One route leads to K'ang-ting, capital of Sikang.
- (ii) The other runs southeast to Batang and then east to K'ang-ting. It is believed that this route is open most of the year, though it crosses several high passes.

(d) An alternative route to China runs north to Nagchuka, then swings northeastward to Jyekundo, and from there southeast through Kan-tzu, after which it joins the other route to K'ang-ting. This route is longer than (c). There is also a route from Jyekundo to Hsi-ning.

Communication

34. A telegraph line connects Lhasa with India via the main trade route (33b). The Gyantse-Lhasa section is under Tibetan control. Tibet's only telephone connects the Potala (the residence of the Dalai Lama) with the Post Office in Lhasa.

35. A daily postal service maintained by runners links Darjeeling with Lhasa.

36. Radio transmission and monitoring by short wave is effected by an Englishman operating as AS4YN in Lhasa. A second monitoring station is operated in Chiamdo in Sikang by an ex-RAF radio operator. Several high officials in Lhasa operate receiving sets given them by the British Mission of 1936-37.

ARMED FORCES

Army

37. The Tibetan Army numbers approximately 10,000 and consists of some 15 Infantry Regiments and an Artillery Company. The main force - some 4 to 6 thousand - is located in the eastern border areas. Available recruits are estimated at 20,000. Equipment consists of small arms and a few 2.7" guns, all of which are obsolete and of varied patterns and makes. The troops are poorly trained and of low morale.

Air Operations

38. Although environmental factors do not preclude air operations, they would severely restrict them. Even following river valleys as a means of ingress and egress (as is done in the Yukon) would be hazardous. Bolivian aircraft operated from airfields at an elevation of 12,000 feet during the Chaco dispute with Paraguay in the 1930's, but aircraft then used did not have the high wing loading of modern aircraft. Fighter operations and photo reconnaissance would be possible. Jet-assisted take-off or long take-off runs could help to overcome the disadvantage of altitude in Tibet. It would be necessary to construct airfields as there are none at present.

39. The types of operations which would suffer most would be transport and bombing (because of restriction of pay-load) and communications and army air observation posts (because of the low ceiling of the light aircraft used for such purposes). The use of airborne troops, especially paratroopers, would be fraught with serious difficulties in oxygen problems and rapid descent due to rarified atmosphere.

CONCLUSIONSStrategic Importance

40. From a review of the foregoing factors, it is considered that China would gain little in an economic sense from the control of Tibet. It would also make no substantial gain in military manpower (of which it already has a surplus) or in military equipment. In addition, if a serious attempt were made to occupy the country and to govern it as an integral province of China, problems of supply and administration might be a drain on Chinese resources. Tibet would not be particularly useful as an air base because of its high altitude. The mountainous character of its territory and the poverty of its land communications would make it virtually useless as a military base or a jumping-off place for ground operations against India.

41. By controlling Tibet, China would gain the following advantages:

- (a) It would not only enhance MAO Tse-Tung's prestige in China but would tend to increase his stature as the leader of communism in Asia.
- (b) It would facilitate communist infiltration into India, particularly through Ladakh, a part of Kashmir, which is culturally and ethnically Tibetan. India, because of its economic conditions, provides a potentially fertile field for communism.
- (c) It would strengthen MAO's hand when dealing with Nehru. Constant pressure would be maintained against India from Chinese-controlled Tibet by the threat of arms smuggling, the despatch of agents and provocateurs and the employment of the customary apparatus of communist underground activity against neighbouring non-communist states.
- (d) It would serve to divert Chinese popular interest away from Formosa if the widely talked-of Chinese communist attack on that place should now be considered too risky to be undertaken.

42. The chief strategic importance of control of Tibet by the Chinese would therefore be political.

Possibility and Methods of Communist Aggression

43. It is evident that the Peking Government desires to establish effective control of Tibet. Apart from open invasion, the following methods of achieving this purpose are available:

- (a) Negotiations with the Tibetan Government accompanied by various forms of economic and military pressure designed to secure an agreement conceding a greater degree of control than theoretical suzerainty.
- (b) The provision of backing for the Panchen Lama and his supporters (the monks in exile) to secure control of Tibet, by civil war, if necessary.
- (c) Weakening the control of the Tibetan Government through the encouragement of dissident monasteries, such as the Sera Che Monastery.

Of the methods mentioned above, (a) is already in progress. The other two require more time and are considered less likely.

44. In considering the invasion of Tibet, the Peking Government would be guided by the following factors. Ample and fully-equipped Chinese forces are available for the invasion of Tibet. There are some 20,000 troops of the First Field Army available to the north of Tibet, some 40,000 from the same army to the northeast, (under General PENG Teh-huai) and up to 80,000 troops of the Second Field Army to the east (under General LIU Po-Cheng). Against this, Tibet has approximately 10,000 poorly-trained and badly-equipped troops, incapable of offering serious resistance. Climatic considerations make an open invasion of Tibet improbable, although not impossible, during the winter. As Tibet has no international status, United Nations action in the event of a Chinese attack would be improbable. India, the only power in a position to attempt active counter-measures, has already indicated that it would not take military action.

45. It may therefore be concluded that the Peking Government is in a favourable position to establish control of Tibet, either by indirect means or by open invasion, and that the only influence restraining MAO Tse-tung from direct action against Tibet is his desire to maintain good relations with India. If relations between India and China worsen and other means of obtaining control fail, Chinese invasion of Tibet will become virtually certain.

Ext. 7A

50077-40
27 27

OTTAWA FILE

No.

Letter No. 921

Date September 5, 1951.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FROM: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN INDIA

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference My letter No. 680 of July 4, 1951.

Subject Tibet.

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SEP 13 1951

The attached copy of a Memorandum, based on a rapid viewing of a thirteen-page summation of recent events in Tibet as interpreted by Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark -- an observer who seems singularly well qualified -- may prove of interest to you. I may say that I have no certain knowledge of Prince Peter's outlook or connections beyond that given.

2. One feature of the information that it contains that is, perhaps, of special interest, concerns the observer's report that the returning Tibetan Treaty delegates had indicated that they did not really wish to sign the "Treaty for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" without prior approval from the Dalai Lama. That they were persuaded to sign in spite of their misgivings might, if true, be taken at some later date to be grounds for voiding the Agreement because of duress.

3. The somewhat nebulous usefulness of this might, however, be rendered even less valuable should the Dalai Lama feel constrained to ratify the action of his delegates. We have seen a PTI-Reuter's report from Washington, dated July 19, in which a State Department official is said to have denied that the Dalai Lama was thinking of repudiating the Treaty. It may well be that His Holiness will, in the end, accord ratification to the instrument. Indeed, short of fleeing the country (which from all indications would appear to be most difficult to accomplish) it is not easy to see how the Dalai Lama would be able to resist Chinese pressure, even if he wished to do so. On the other hand, it is not impossible that the Chinese would prefer to be rid of the Dalai Lama so that they might instal the Panchen Lama in the seat of supreme authority from which he would be empowered to give full effect to the Treaty. In any case, it seems safe to assume that, for many years to come, some Tibetan leaders will be eager to refute the Treaty should the factual situation make that physically practicable.

4. The above observations may have some relevance in your assessment of the comments in

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18/9/51
 Mr. [unclear]
 Commonwealth Div
 file R. L. ROGERS 13 SEP 1951

Canada House's letters Nos. 3100 and 3120 of July 25 concerning the legal status of Tibet under the new circumstances. The observer we have been quoting is certainly of the view that the Chinese negotiators at Peking made no great effort to hide their own interpretation that Tibet is to be another Chinese province.

5. Other statements contained in our observer's summary recall unconfirmed press reports which have appeared during the last month and a half. A PTI release dated at Kalimpong on July 17 referred to a story current on the Indo-Tibetan caravan routes to the effect that 700 Red troops had reached Gianda-Dzong, 150 miles north-east of Lhasa. Several papers have since reported the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa on August 17. Most of these stories also carried mention of the fact that 700 troops, reputedly led by 45-year-old Sawang Ngabon, Cabinet Minister and the delegate to China who is supposed to have been forced to return by the long overland route, were also expected to arrive in Lhasa. The Statesman of August 28 reported that Ngabon had reached Lhasa from Chamdo with a small detachment of liberation forces, and that he is expected to give an account of the Sino-Tibetan negotiations to the Dalai Lama and the Cabinet. If necessary, the paper says, the account will be placed before the National Assembly.

6. Additional units of Chinese troops were reported by UPI on August 22 to have reached the Gyangtse area where, in virtue of the Indo-Tibetan Treaty, an Indian trade agent and some Indian troops were permitted to be posted. The Statesman of August 28 carried a further report on the advance of Communist units operating in eastern Tibet from Tsari in Takto District to Tsonazong on Bhutan's north-east frontier. The paper stated that the Communists in the area were expected to move in a north-western direction towards Lhobrang, Ghantzi and Ralung to avoid the mountainous terrain on Bhutan's northern frontier.

7. Several papers have referred to the imminent possibility that the Panchen Lama will follow the Dalai Lama to Lhasa from his present resting place at Sinan in Chin-Ghai province.

8. The Statesman of August 10 reported that thousands of Tibetans and Chinese are engaged in constructing a road from Chamdo to Lhasa. Because of the unfavourable nature of the terrain it is said to be necessary to drop food supplies to the Chinese from aircraft based at Chengtu. Chamdo is on the Meekong River which runs parallel to the Yangtse some fifty miles farther away from Szechuan province.

9. We have noted many references in the Indian press to the passage through Kalimpong of Chinese experts and we are persuaded that the figure of 50 such experts given by our observer is probably reasonably accurate.

10. The press, during the past month, has also devoted a good deal of attention to reports concerning Communist activities in western Tibet, principally in the area proximate to the 250-300 mile boundary with Uttar Pradesh province of India. The main activity seems to hinge on Taklakot and Gartok, said respectively to be playing host to Communist forces of 200 and 500 troops. A motorable road is reported to be under construction to cover the 800 miles between Lhasa and western Tibet. The enclosed copy of a Statesman article of August 4 will, I believe, give you rather fuller information in this regard than other press accounts.

11. One feature of the activity in western Tibet that is, perhaps, worth specifying here, is the story that agents equipped with old survey maps "are busy verifying Tibet's boundaries with India and Nepal." Other experts are alleged to be selecting sites for aerodromes in an area where numerous "holy" lakes provide ideal conditions for water-based aircraft. Recently, Wing Commander C. E. Slee, Air Adviser to the U.K. High Commissioner here, told Mr. Jay that American sources had informed him that Soviet flying boats had been using these lakes for some time. You will recall our letter No.298 of March 22, 1951, on the subject of a New York Times article of November 24, 1950, written by Robert Trumbull, in which reference was also made to Soviet penetration to the lakes. At the time it was most difficult to assess the accuracy of Trumbull's story, although the general feeling seemed to be that it was necessary to apply a "pinch of salt."

12. The Statesman of August 28 reported that the Communist advance in western Tibet is continuing from Lake Mansarovar to Nepal's northern frontier. The paper assumed that the immediate objectives of the Communists in western Tibet were the important trade centres of Tradom (from where the trade route crosses the Nepal frontier by the Kore Pass leading to Kathmandu) and Tingri-Dzong where a Tibetan garrison of some 500 soldiers is normally maintained. The paper also points out that the overall strategy seems to be a movement of small forces along the entire Indo-Tibetan-Himalayan frontier (including Nepal and Bhutan) with check-posts at all important passes and trade centres.

13. Most of these stories, which, for obvious reasons, are difficult to authenticate,

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Albela House, Kalimpong,
West Bengal, India.

5th. August, 1958.

on return

Secretary to the Governor-General
Office.

File
[Signature]

The Governor General of Canada,
O t t a w a,
CANADA.

Your Excellency,

Tibet is essentially an independent country with sovereign powers. Its people being religious and peace-loving, no stock of modern weapons of war were kept within its boundaries. In the year 1950 the Chinese Communists invaded our land with about five hundred thousand of their so-called "liberation army" and over-powered our frontier guards. Later they settled some four million Chinese immigrants in the eastern and north-eastern regions. These settlers, along with their powerful armies, have attempted to destroy our religion, culture and traditions. A separate Manifesto describing the plight of our people is attached hereto for your perusal. In it you will read of the merciless treatment of our people by the Chinese, and how many have had to flee to the far-off deserts and valleys. It is for these reasons that our people are fighting for freedom. There are hundreds being killed daily by the Chinese in these battles.

There is trouble also in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. Recently some thirty thousand people from the southern areas had to leave their property, families and settled life to save themselves from the brutal treatment of the Chinese over-lords. Now without homes, these people are also out in the deserts and it is feared that there may be uprisings in the south and central areas, as a consequence.

Not only have the Chinese Communists occupied our country making every effort to exploit our people, but they have also made Tibet into a huge arsenal that can have no other conceivable purpose than a future offensive against her neighbouring countries and the world at large. They are building army barracks, forts, bridges and air-fields at strategic places, and their extensive programme for constructing great roads and railways is mainly to accelerate the movement of their armed forces.


India, a country which was under British domination for over 150 years, achieved her independence just after the World War II. Similarly, a number of other countries who were under foreign yokes for generations have attained their independence within the past few years. On the contrary, the independence of Tibet, an essentially free country which, as history proves, was at no time under any foreign domination, was violated by the Communist China her next door neighbour. Shall the August World Body which stands for peace and justice in the present world justify the atrocious actions of the Communist China on Tibet, a peace-loving and religious country, while the people are fighting tooth and nail in the struggle for their very existence ?

Since yours is a country which prizes its freedom, we look to you to do what you can to help.

Yours faithfully,

We the Representatives,

Tibet Chhokhasum.



MEMORANDUM

file for me

MR

TO: ..The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.....

Security ..SECRET.....

DateMarch 24/59.....

FROM:Far Eastern Division.....

File No.		
50077-40		
54	✓	

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT:.....POLITICAL UNREST IN TIBET.....

Sent 24.3.59

Attached for your signature, if you approve, is a memorandum to the Prime Minister on the Tibetan question, along with a statement which he might make in the House if the need should arise.

Mr Collins
FAR EASTERN DIVISION

CIRCULATION

Ext. 326 (6/56)

24.3.18/59

*See to ensure
Thatcher
April 9/59
Roh*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

March 24, 1959

POLITICAL UNREST IN TIBET.

50077-40
51

Reports in Monday's press appear to confirm that serious disturbances have been going on in Lhasa since last Thursday. Information is meagre and in large part unreliable. The Indian Consul-General in Lhasa, however, has apparently reported that street fighting in Lhasa broke out when the rumour spread that the Tibetan spiritual and temporal ruler, the Dalai Lama, was about to be arrested by the Chinese Communist representative and would be removed from Lhasa to Peking. Whether or not this rumour was well founded, crowds of people assembled near the Dalai Lama's residence and small arms fire broke out. Subsequent reports indicate that the situation in Lhasa is now quieter but there is no word as to the whereabouts or wellbeing of the Dalai Lama. It seems quite possible that renewed violence could occur.

[Handwritten signature]

24.3.18/551

Tibet, with a population of about 4,000,000, is one of the most isolated regions of the world. Normal means of communication are almost completely lacking, and India is the only non-Communist country with any representation in Tibet. The Tibetans are deeply religious Buddhists who revere the Dalai Lama. Consequently the Chinese Communists have been attempting to control the population through the Dalai Lama. The latter, however, has given evidence of resistance to Communist indoctrination.

There has been a history of intermittent strife and guerilla warfare in Tibet ever since the Chinese Communist invasion in 1950. Throughout the past year in particular there have been repeated reports of a guerilla campaign led by Khamba tribesmen of Southern and South-eastern Tibet. Some press reports have indicated that large portions of Tibet were controlled by the Tibetan guerillas who ranged to within 40 miles of Lhasa. Private Indian comment prior to the new outbreak suggested that the reports were exaggerated.

Diefenbaker, John George

Prime Minister:
(1957 - 1963)

We are not aware of any position having been taken by Canada in recent years on the question of Tibet's relationship with China. Historically the status of Tibet in international law has been uncertain and ill-defined. At times Tibet has given evidence of a considerable degree of independence. In recent times, however, there seems to have been a wide measure of agreement to the effect that Tibet was vaguely under nominal Chinese suzerainty. After the Communist invasion of 1950 the Chinese sought to establish physical control of the country, and a general agreement signed in 1951 by representatives of Tibet and the Peking régime gave control of Tibet's foreign relations to Communist China, while permitting the stationing of Communist Chinese troops at various points within Tibet. Control over Tibet's internal affairs, however, was left to the Tibetan Government.

Despite the promise of internal autonomy, the Chinese Government apparently began preparations to exert full sovereignty over Tibet. In face of considerable Tibetan resistance, together with a certain amount of Indian diplomatic pressure, these plans were, in part at

least, suspended. The events of the past week may indicate a renewed Communist effort to impose a firmer internal control.

India, for political and strategic reasons, has an obvious special interest in neighbouring Tibet. It seems clear that India acknowledges the right of Communist China to control the foreign affairs of Tibet. This is demonstrated by the signing of a Sino-Indian agreement in 1954 which confirmed India's commercial rights in Tibet. It is also indicated by the remarks of Prime Minister Nehru in the Indian Parliament on August 20, 1958 in which he said (as reported by the Times of India) "I submit that Tibet, long long before the Communist régime there, was always looked upon and considered by the world community as being under the suzerainty of China....It is completely true that there had been periods in Tibetan history that, when Tibet was strong, she (Tibet) did not acknowledge that position. But I am talking about our position in the matter. We took up a certain position and messages have been exchanged and published. We could not possibly interfere, neither in law nor in fact." This cautious attitude

was repeated by Mr. Nehru in the Indian Parliament on March 23, 1959 when, in commenting on the Tibetan disturbances, he contented himself with expressing hope for the safety of the Dalai Lama and for the peaceful resolution of the present troubles. The United Kingdom Government has also in the past recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

I attach for your consideration a possible statement which you might wish to make in case the matter is referred to in the House.



N.A.R.



CANADA

FOREIGN TRADE SERVICE

Letter No. 25

P.O. Box 126, Hong Kong.

June 23, 1959.

TO Mr. Pope JUN 29 1959 REGISTRY

Mr. R.E. Collins, Far Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.

Dear Ralph:

re: Tibet

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With enclosure:

Mr. Holmes
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Price
Far Eastern
Commonwealth
DL2
Pd. Cont. (2)
UN Div.
New Delhi
Moscow
Pennis N.Y.
518 (through DL2)
+ file
J.S. Helliker
Far Eastern
July 2/59

copy given to Mr. H.C. August 1959

The return of the Panchen Lama to Lhasa on June 15th after more than two months in China marked the end of one phase of Sino-Tibetan relations and the beginning of another. The Panchen Lama is reported by the Hsinhua News Service to have said at a welcoming banquet given by the Working Committee of the C.C.P. in Tibet, the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Tibet Military Area Command: "The Tibetan people have been urgently demanding reforms and following the complete defeat of the counter-revolutionary armed rebellion, such demands have become more imperative than ever." Speaking at the same banquet, Wang Feng* who returned with the Panchen Lama from China and who shared the place of honour with him, "wished outstanding success to the introduction of reforms and to reconstruction in Tibet." In his welcoming speech, Chang Ching-wu* said that "The task before us is to carry out democratic reform which is urgently demanded by the broad masses of people in Tibet as well as completely put down the rebellion. We warmly welcome the return of Panchen Erdeni to lead the work. We are fully convinced that this honorable task will be accomplished successfully under the wise and correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's Government and by firm reliance on the labouring masses."

2. There can be little doubt that the few words quoted above presage a drive on the part of the Chinese to institute the communizing reforms they have hitherto hesitated to impose on Tibet and it appears that they now intend to press ahead using the Panchen Lama as their instrument. How successful they will be remains to be seen but there is no doubt that they have the military strength to carry out the task if they wish. In fact, they are in a far better position to do so today than they were when they initially conquered Tibet in 1950-51. At that time, in addition to all the domestic problems they faced from their recent assumption of power in China, they were also training and supplying the Vietminh on

* Wang Feng - Vice head of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the C.C.P. and Vice Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission.
Chang Ching-wu - Representative of the Central People's Government and Secretary of the Working Committee of the C.C.P. in Tibet

NO ENCL. TO BE 2

their Southern border and had taken the plunge across their North-Eastern border into the Korean War. At the present time they are faced merely with internal economic chaos and tempting opportunities for mischief in Laos, Vietnam, Korea and the offshore islands! Furthermore, current Chinese efforts to promote tension in Laos and Vietnam may not be entirely unrelated to Tibet, for any flare-up in the Indo-China area would command immediate international attention because of the number of nations directly involved -- U.S.S.R., U.S.A., U.K., France, Canada, Poland and China as well as North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia -- and this would certainly draw attention away from Chinese activities in Tibet.

3. I have said in my letter of June 18th that the related topics of Tibet and Sino-Indian relations occupied by far the largest amount of space in the Chinese press and propaganda in recent months. For example, the Hsinhua English-language news service alone issued over 500 foolscap pages of comment (or close to 20% of the total in the period) on Tibet between the 28th of March and the end of May (most of it in April. - A sharp decline in output occurred about a week after the close of the National People's Congress on April 28). The Chinese domestic press in the same period devoted similar amounts of space to the Tibetan question. The reports both in the Chinese press and in the Hsinhua releases for foreign consumption omitted very little comment from any available source during the crisis period. Both favourable and unfavourable reports from abroad were quoted at great length and in fact the Chinese treated themselves to an orgy of both digestible and indigestible comments from every possible source. This poses the question as to why they printed in such detail criticism from abroad, as well as items of support from foreign sources. It appears that the Chinese seized upon the whole question to build up domestic support at a time when economic conditions in China had reached a very low point. It is significant that the National People's Congress occupied about a third of its time discussing Tibet which was not even on its agenda and it appears that the Chinese authorities welcomed the development of this issue at a time when there was very little to cheer about. Tibet was used as a rallying cry in an effort to unite the nation and to divert its attention from domestic problems. For those deputies to the Congress who had travelled great distances, Tibet provided something of substance to take home to distant constituencies whereas without it the message would have been dry and uninspiring. In printing virtually everything, both good and bad, on the Tibetan situation, the Chinese attempted -- but not too convincingly, at least to non-Chinese audiences -- to refute and ridicule critical foreign points of view. In fact they had no need to be convincing at home because all Chinese regard Tibet as an integral part of China. For this reason, Chinese military action against the Tibetans was readily acceptable domestically and the foreign outcry against it provided a natural rallying point for the N.P.C. and for the nation as a whole.

4. On this point it is worth recalling that the Nationalist Chinese in Formosa think alike with their Communist countrymen in China, although naturally they tried to capitalize on the situation in their propaganda. Chiang Kai-shek's message to the people of Tibet on March 25th, although it went much further than expected, fell short of offering complete freedom and independence despite its fine sounding reference to the principle of self-determination.* Had Chiang Kai-shek

--- * See attachment quoting press version of Chiang Kai-shek's statement.

been in control in China when the uprising occurred he would have acted in the same manner but probably less efficiently. The following illustration underlines the common viewpoint on Tibet shared by virtually all Chinese, Nationalist, Communist or unaffiliated: At a recent round-table conference on Tibet in the United States Consulate-General here which included the anti-Communist Chinese staff working for the Americans, the United States members took an indignant line on Communist action in Tibet expecting their Chinese staff to agree. However, it appears that as the meeting progressed, the Chinese staff members became more and more heated in pointing out that Tibet was in fact a part of China and the meeting broke up with feelings frayed on both sides.

5. The course of the Sino-Indian disagreement over Tibet has shown clearly that on issues considered vital by the Chinese neither Indian nor any other opinion will sway them in their actions. The difference between the two countries also brought out the Chinese contempt for India's soft line and, particularly, for those Indians who, like Krishna Menon, use every sort of argument, both good and bad, to demonstrate that all is well between India and China. Even though the Chinese must consider Nehru to be extremely useful to their cause, they came very close to openly insulting him and only in the final stages made some effort to keep criticism of India and Nehru within bounds. Indidentally Western visitors to the recent Canton trade fair were entertained at a special evening put on by the Fair authorities with the rendering of the (then) latest Chinese hit tune: "Drive out the Indian Expansionists".

6. There is no doubt about the profound effect of Chinese action in Tibet on Indians in particular and on South East Asians generally. China has lost as much prestige in the East over this event as the Soviet Union did over Hungary. However, ^{in the West,} Western countries should not conclude that China's loss has resulted in a corresponding gain for Western style democracy. The West in this case has perhaps scored a negative sort of gain in that virtually no one has been deluded by the Chinese into thinking the Tibetan uprising was the result of a Western engineered imperialist plot. If anything, the net gain has been scored by the neutralists as Asians are more likely than ever to strive to fashion their own course down a middle way between the communism of China and the democracy of the West. Mr. Nehru too has regained much of the prestige in Asia that he appeared to lose at Bandung and since. While the West may have been impatient with his reluctance to openly condemn the Chinese, his dignified and restrained behaviour has been in marked contrast to the violence and near hysteria of the Chinese and has met with general approval in the Far East.

7. There has been some speculation about the circumstances surrounding the Dalai Lama's escape to India, i.e., as to whether or not the Chinese permitted this to take place or in fact made an effort to prevent it. No conclusive evidence has appeared on this point so far. If the Dalai Lama had been prevented from escaping there might well have been more bloodshed and the Dalai Lama could have been injured or killed in the melee. In any case he would have had to be brought back to Lhasa against his will and his presence in such circumstances would have been embarrassing. On the other hand, his escape to India was equally or even more embarrassing in providing a focus for Indian and international attention as well as a hope for Tibetans in the future. In addition, the Chinese seem to have genuinely believed at first that the Dalai Lama was being forced to act against his will. (Their faith in the Dalai's three letters to General Tan Kuan-san appears to have been genuine.)

On balance, it was probably a greater embarrassment to have him escape and it is probable that the Chinese would have prevented it had they been able to do so.

8. Despite resistance in some form or another in Tibet ever since the Chinese established their control in 1951, it would appear that the suddenness and violence of the March 19th outbreak in Lhasa both surprised and shocked the Chinese, and their vanity seems to have been wounded by the ungratefulness of the Tibetans for the "gentle" treatment meted out by their Chinese conquerors. In some Western quarters the latest Tibetan uprising has been attributed to a revulsion to new ideas and general reforms unrelated to communism. Doubtless these have been elements contributing to the friction between the conquerors and the conquered but the basic ingredients have been the congenital Tibetan dislike and distrust of their Chinese overlords. Although the Chinese have announced frequently since late March that the uprising has been suppressed, their pronouncements in this connection often contain such qualifying terms as "substantially suppressed" when claiming victory. It appears that although the main struggle has ended, sporadic resistance is continuing.

9. This year's violent protest by the Tibetans against their Chinese conquerors has served to remind the world of a struggle which has been endemic in south central Asia for hundreds of years but which was resumed actively nine years ago when the Chinese decided to "liberate" Tibet -- from the Tibetans themselves since the Nationalist hold on Tibet had never been effective and Britain and India had long since relinquished any claim to direct influence in the area. China's absence from the United Nations Organization in 1950 when its invasion of Tibet commenced, the vague concept of Chinese suzerainty accepted by many nations including the most interested parties--the United Kingdom and India -- and general apathy towards the fate of the million or so Tibetans in Tibet proper, resulted in Tibet's appeals for help at the time going unanswered. The operation of the same factors in 1959 prevented the only action that might have been taken by the non-Communist countries, given the circumstances surrounding the recent Tibetan outbreak. United Nations action, had China been a member, could not have gone much beyond the action taken in the case of Hungary and would have had no more tangible effect on China than the United Nations efforts had on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. was unquestionably disconcerted by United Nations action at that time and only the coincidence of the Suez crisis saved it from experiencing still greater embarrassment and loss of prestige. By the same token, had China been a member of the United Nations it would not have acted differently in Tibet but would have suffered greater embarrassment and loss of prestige than it in fact has -- perhaps not immediately but at least in the long run, as the case could well have remained open for a number of years and even Communist governments which ignore external pressure at any given moment are not entirely insensitive to attrition over the long haul. The Tibetans too might have been given something to hope for. Admittedly, the failure of the United Nations to act on the Tibetan appeals of 1950 might have been regarded in some quarters as a precedent restricting action in support of Tibet in 1959 -- even if China had been a member of the United Nations Organization. However, the simple fact is that the Chinese broke the 1951 Sino-Tibetan treaty which had embodied the principle of Tibetan autonomy. Furthermore, the treaty was a dictated one made possible by force of arms -- the same type of "unequal treaty" the Chinese have so often attacked and repudiated where they were the affected party. The Tibetans were therefore entitled to consideration in the United Nations which, it may be recalled, had not shrunk from taking up the case of the British in Cyprus (or the French in Algeria or a variety of similar cases) where the British (French or other) claim was not unlike that of China's to control

Tibet. The fact that salt water rather than mountain ranges intervened between the respective large and small countries is quite irrelevant. It is sometimes argued that United Nations intervention over Tibet -- even if China had been a member -- would have complicated the situation and detracted from the benefits accruing from Asian disillusionment with Chinese communism. There may be some merit in this type of reasoning but if the United Nations acts only in certain cases and dodges those of an inconvenient nature its long run effectiveness will be severely restricted.

10. In summary, the following are some of the major conclusions to be drawn from the Tibetan affair:

- (a) The Chinese were both shocked and surprised by the suddenness and violence of the outbreak which took place on and after March 19th. The basic cause of the latest, and all Tibetan uprisings was Tibetan dislike and distrust of their Chinese conquerors -- not merely of new ideas and reforms.
- (b) China is willing to go to almost any lengths, including the alienation of India's friendship and support, where it considers its vital interests are affected as in the case of Tibet this year and Korea in 1950-53.
- (c) China suffered a great loss of prestige in South East Asia over its action in Tibet. Mr. Nehru and the neutralists have probably gained what China has lost while the West -- for once -- has escaped with no opprobrium attached to its actions and this may justifiably be regarded as a victory -- even if it is of a negative nature.
- (d) ~~Virtually all Chinese~~ Communist, Nationalist or unaffiliated -- consider Tibet a part of China and Chiang Kai-shek's promise of self-determination after liberation from the Communists did not mean complete freedom and independence for Tibet.
- (e) The Chinese will probably press on with their reform program for Tibet, considering that their previous "soft" policy has failed. The Panchen Lama will be used as an instrument to promote this program, although it is probable that the Chinese still hope that the Dalai Lama can be persuaded to return.
- (f) The promotion of tension in the Indo-China area will be used to divert attention from Tibet as well as from domestic economic difficulties. Other areas such as Korea or the offshore islands can be reactivated for the same purpose if necessary.
- (g) The Chinese leaders probably accepted the Tibetan outbreak as a godsend during the National People's Congress to detract attention from domestic economic difficulties and to be used as a rallying call for unity and for greater efforts than ever. Although embarrassing abroad, it was extremely useful domestically and was fully exploited for this purpose. The Tibetan situation was used as an excuse to flay imperialism, the United States, the United Kingdom and the West generally at a time when interest and enthusiasm within China appeared to be flagging as a result of economic problems and dissatisfaction stemming from the establishment of the communes.

- (h) China's absence from the United Nations prevented the only action that might have been taken by the non-Communist countries in the circumstances surrounding the recent Tibetan outbreak and emphasizes again the desirability of China's membership in the United Nations to provide a point of pressure when such occasions arise (and there could be others in Laos, Vietnam, Korea or the Formosa Straits at any time).

Admittedly, the Chinese would not have been prevented from taking the action they did to suppress the uprising but there is no reason to believe that the Chinese Government is very different from other governments in its ability to resist the effects of focusing world attention on a problem such as Tibet over a protracted period of time. In the short run, it could ignore such attention but in the long run even Communist governments can be brought to modify their actions. This is not a plea for immediate recognition or United Nations membership for China but merely a suggestion that the time may have arrived for a fresh look at steps that might be taken towards these objectives—for our own benefit.

Yours sincerely,



(C.J. Small)

Canadian Government Trade Commissioner.

Encl.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

November 28, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓ The Prime Minister

Reply to letter from the Dalai Lama

Attached for your signature, if you approve, is a reply to the Dalai Lama's letter to you of October 28. This will be transmitted to the Dalai Lama through the Office of the Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi.

*Letter signed
Dec 5 / 1961*



H. C. G.

(COPY)

Swargashram
Dharamsala Cantt.,
Punjab, India.

His Excellency
the Rt.Hon'ble Mr. John
Diefenbaker
Prime Minister of Canada,

October 28, 1961

Your Excellency,

Will you kindly refer to your very kind letter of the 29th of September, 1960?

As Your Excellency is no doubt aware, the question of Tibet could not be taken into consideration by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its last session. A resolution will now be moved by the Government of Malaya and Thailand, and I am taking the liberty of enclosing herewith copy of a letter which I have addressed to His Excellency the Prime Minister of Malaya. The situation in Tibet has become extremely precarious. As His Excellency the Prime Minister of India has said, it is very strange indeed that so many thousands of Tibetan refugees are pouring into India. The accounts which I have recently received clearly show that there must be immediate cessation to death and destruction which prevail in Tibet, as otherwise there will be nothing left of Tibet and there will be no Tibetans at all, nor will there be any question of human rights of the Tibetans. In view of the extreme gravity of the situation I would beg of Your Excellency and your Government to persuade the United Nations to adopt such measures as might bring about a peaceful end to the grim tragedy of today. On several occasions Canada and her Government have played a leading role in upholding the rights of the smaller nations of the world. I am, therefore, encouraged to hope that my personal appeal to Your Excellency will not fail.

With assurances of my highest esteem and consideration, I remain,

Yours sincerely

The Dalai Lama

FIFTEENTH SESSION

PART II
CONFIDENTIAL

August 31, 1961.

THE QUESTION OF TIBET

50077-40	
7	—

(a) Background references

General Assembly resolutions.

1353 (XIV) The Question of Tibet

General Assembly document.

A/4444, August 19, 1960 - Request for Inscription
of Tibetan Item on the Agenda of the Fifteenth
Session (Malaya and Thailand)

General Committee

127th Meeting, Thursday, 22nd September, 1960 -
Official Records of the Fifteenth Session
of the United Nations General Assembly.

(b) Issues Facing the General Assembly

The Assembly may have to deal with a resolution of the type adopted at the fourteenth session calling for respect for the rights of the Tibetan people or, as was the case at the fifteenth session, a debate on inscription of the Tibetan question may take place in the General Committee without proceeding to consideration of a resolution on the substance of the question in plenary session.

The issue most likely to be raised in the General Committee is whether or not the Assembly should be precluded from discussing the question under Article 2 (7). For those countries, including Canada, which accept that the United Nations General Assembly has the right and is competent to consider a question of this nature, the issues involved are the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Tibetan people, specifically their cultural, religious and civil liberties. In the fourteenth and fifteenth sessions the issues of the international status of Tibet, Chinese claims to sovereignty, international intervention and investigation were avoided, primarily because even those

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nations disturbed by events in Tibet considered that the United Nations had no means of taking effective action. If the Tibetan question is inscribed again this year - and its inscription has been requested by Malaya and Thailand - these issues will probably be avoided again for the same reason.

(c) Attitudes of Directly Interested Parties

Because the question of Tibet only passed the General Committee stage last year, it is necessary to revert to the fourteenth session for a more complete indication of attitudes of the various powers. In the debate on the Tibetan question at that session, all speakers (nearly 40 percent of total membership), with the exception of those from the Soviet bloc, deplored the actions of the Chinese Communists in Tibet with varying degrees of intensity. Yet nearly one-third of the membership, including the United Kingdom, France, most of the Latin Americans, and most of the Asians, abstained when voting on the resolution for one or more of the following reasons:

- i) Reasonable doubt regarding the status of Tibet and, therefore, the competence of the United Nations to pronounce on the issue;
- ii) lack of a solution to the problem of Chinese representation;
- iii) the effect of the debate on either the lessening of tension or the interests of the Tibetans.

The Soviet bloc voted solidly against inscription and against the resolution, while just over half of the United Nations membership, including Canada, voted for both.

Although the sponsors achieved their aim, there was little enthusiasm for the debate. At the fifteenth session, there was less discussion on Tibet since it was not debated in plenary session, but attitudes and positions

adopted were approximately the same and the powers divided on the question of inscription of the Tibetan item along approximately the same lines as had been the case a year earlier.

Smaller Anti-communist Countries (Malaya, Ireland, El Salvador, etc.): These countries in the past have stressed the duty of the United Nations to take note of and condemn violations of human rights whether or not the matter is one of internal jurisdiction.

Soviet Bloc: The Soviet Union and its allies have adopted three main arguments:

- i) The Tibetan question has been introduced for obstructionist and cold war purposes.
- ii) Because Tibet is an inalienable part of China, the General Assembly is not competent to deal with it.
- iii) Chinese action in Tibet has been directed at the removal of an unjust social system and the introduction of "democratic reforms".

Uncommitted Countries: Most of these countries in the past have based their doubts about the propriety or value of Assembly action on:

- 1) Article 2 (7);
- ii) the absence of a Chinese Communist delegation;
- iii) the possibility that a debate would increase world tension and worsen the plight of the Tibetan people.

Some Western Countries have abstained on the grounds that the Assembly is not competent to discuss the issue under Article 2 (7). These countries have included France, the United Kingdom, Spain, South Africa and Belgium, although in some cases, such as the United Kingdom and

Belgium, they have voted in favour of inscription of the item on the Agenda.

In general, no change in these attitudes is expected this year, although there may be even less enthusiasm for a debate on Tibet than there has been in the past.

(d) Likely Course of Events

On August 18, 1961, Malaya and Thailand requested inscription of "The Question of Tibet", as they had done a year earlier. There will likely again be a debate on its inscription in the General Committee before it is debated in plenary session of the Assembly. Two years ago debate was on a moderately worded resolution condemning the Chinese but not calling for specific Assembly action. At that session, the United States Delegation attempted to have the item discussed in the First Committee, to which it wished to invite the Dalai Lama. The sponsors of the resolution opposed this idea and it was referred directly to plenary. Another move that came to nothing for lack of general support was a United Kingdom proposal to debate the question without voting on a resolution.

At the fifteenth session, in the course of an intervention principally devoted to disarmament, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada suggested that it would be logical to send the Tibetan item to the First Committee in the same way that other similar items were allocated for committee consideration. However, by a vote of 11 in favour to 4 against (Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia), with 4 abstentions (Canada, Ceylon, Iraq and Sudan), the General Committee recommended that the item be considered in plenary. The Assembly subsequently approved this decision without further discussion. Although the item reappeared

on the Agenda of the resumed session in early 1961, it was not discussed again in the Assembly. If the matter is raised at all this year, the course of events will likely again follow the pattern of either the fourteenth or the fifteenth sessions.

(e) Policy Considerations Involved for Canada

Canadian opinion was disturbed by the events in Tibet. For that reason the Canadian Delegation to the fourteenth session worked for and supported a resolution condemning Chinese Communist action in Tibet on the basis of a violation of human rights. The Canadian Delegation thought that the principal danger to be avoided was a situation in which most of China's neighbours would oppose any resolution and thus in effect condone China's actions. In order to avoid this, it considered that the resolution should be moderate, stick to human rights and avoid political judgments about the international status of Tibet. Although the matter was not debated in plenary session last year, similar considerations lay behind the Canadian vote for inscription of the Tibetan question on the Agenda.

There is no apparent reason to modify this attitude at the current session. The only problem concerns the usefulness of a new debate. Although the United Nations cannot accept the suppression of human rights in Tibet, it is not in a position to take effective action to enforce its views. A debate which produces a resolution similar to that of two years ago might merely point up the impotence of the United Nations. In the past there have been suggestions to set up a committee of enquiry on Tibet. It is not thought that this would achieve general support, because it would not be admitted to Tibet and could do no more

than has already been done by the International Commission of Jurists.

(f) Approved Instructions

Although the Delegation should not play an active role in this question, it should vote in favour of inscription and a moderately worded resolution which condemns the Chinese Communist violations of human rights in Tibet.

(g) Suggested Lines in Discussion

The Delegation might point out in discussions with other delegations the need for maximum support for a resolution from Asian and African countries in order to provide a general reflection of Assembly opinion. To ensure this result, it would be necessary to concentrate on the human rights aspect of the problem without making any judgments about Tibet's status under international law.

Voting at the Fourteenth Session

	<u>FOR</u>	<u>AGAINST</u>	<u>ABSTAINED</u>
Inscription of Item	43	11	25
Irish-Malayan Resolution	45	9	26

Voting at the Fifteenth Session

Inscription of the Item:

General Committee	11	4	5
Roll-call Vote	49	13	35
For Consideration in Plenary	11	4	4

Far Eastern/J.R.Sharpe/md

cc: Mr. R. Campbell
Mr. H. B. Robinson
Minister's File

50077-40	
92	

Ottawa, October 12, 1960.

Dear Mr. Singh:

Thank you for your telegram regarding General Assembly consideration of the question of Tibet. You will be interested to know that I recently informed Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, when replying to a letter he had addressed to Mr. Diefenbaker, that the Canadian Delegation would be sympathetic to all initiatives designed to ensure respect for human rights in Tibet and to alleviate the lot of the Tibetan people.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by
H. C. GREEN

H. C. Green.

J. J. Singh,
17 East 54th Street,
New York 22, New York.

50077-40	
14	—

September 29, 1966.

Your Holiness:

I have received your letter of September 13th which requested the support of the Canadian Government for the resolution on the question of Tibet which will be proposed at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly.

Allow me to assure Your Holiness that the Canadian Delegation will be receptive to all initiatives seeking to ensure respect for the human rights of the people of Tibet.

Accept, Your Holiness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

John G. Diefenbaker

His Holiness,
The Dalai Lama,
Swargashram,
Dharamsala Cantt.,
East Punjab. (India)

57077-40	
92	✓

*File
jn*

September 7, 1960.

Dear Mr. Narayan,

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letter of August 1960 regarding the situation in Tibet. I have no need to tell you that the Canadian Government shares your condemnation of the denials of human rights in Tibet.

As you know, the Government of the Federation of Malaya has inscribed the question of Tibet on the agenda of the 15th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In approaching this question, the Canadian delegation will be sympathetic to all initiatives designed to ensure respect for human rights in Tibet and to alleviate the lot of the Tibetan people.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by
HOWARD GREEN

H. G. Green.

Jayaprakash Narayan, Esq.,
The Afro-Asian Council,
30, Ferozshah Road,
NEW DELHI 1.

MEMORANDUM
FROM THE OFFICE OF CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

To.....THE UNDER-SECRETARY.....

October 8, 1959.

Handwritten notes:
Mr. Pope
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Belmont

Tibet

Handwritten:
free
R

This is to record that the Prime Minister has seen this morning telegrams 1328 and 1329 on Tibet and that he concurs in the recommendation of the Delegation as to inscription of the item and support for the draft resolution in its present form. The Prime Minister also agrees that it would be as well for the Delegation not to speak in the debate.

Handwritten signature:
H.B.R.

H. B. Robinson.

c.c. Far Eastern Division

Handwritten note:
Mr. Robinson gave the P.M.'s views to Mr. R. Campbell by telephone, Oct. 8
J.W.H.

Handwritten:
file
T. A. [Signature]

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14	✓

8.10.44(us)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

046

File 1-10-59

46

ad

FM: EXTERNAL OTTAWA CANADA	DATE	FILE		SECURITY
	OCT. 1 1959	58077-40 14	14	CONFIDENTIAL
TO: CANDEL, NY <i>mb</i>	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE		COMCENTRE USE ONLY
	Y-229	OPIMMEDIATE		
INFO:				

Ref.: YOUR TELEGRAMS 1265 AND 1266 OF SEPTEMBER 30.

Subject: TIBET

THE REVISED IRISH DRAFT IS AN IMPROVEMENT ON THE ORIGINAL. WE ARE STILL DOUBTFUL, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE VALUE OF PARAGRAPH 3. WE TAKE IT THAT THE REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF TIBETAN AUTONOMY IS DESIGNED TO LESSEN THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE 2 (7). IT COULD BE ARGUED, NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE ATTRIBUTION OF LOGAL AUTONOMY IS A MATTER FOR THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCALITY CONCERNED AND IS NOT DEPENDENT ON INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THE QUESTION AT ISSUE IS NOT ONE OF TIBET'S AUTONOMOUS OR NON-AUTONOMOU STATUS, BUT ONE OF THE VIOLATION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE CHINE. IF A PARAGRAPH OF THE SORT MUST BE MAINTAINED IN THE FINAL RESOLUTION, WE WOULD MUCH PREFER IT TO READ AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE MINDFUL ALSO OF THE TRADITIONAL, RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL AND

.../2

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG. NAME..... T.M. POPE/mb	FAR EASTERN	6-6129	SIG. NAME.....



MEMORANDUM

TO
A

Commonwealth Division

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM
De

Far Eastern Division

DATE

November 10, 1967

REFERENCE
Référence

Attached Telegram 584 of November 2
from Berne

NUMBER
Numéro

SUBJECT
Sujet

Settlement of Tibetan Refugees in Canada

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	cc 20-1-2-01100m; 20-Tibet
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

1

DISTRIBUTION

UN Div.

Mr. Anderson

You will note that Berne have now replied to the enquiry which this division sent out in September regarding the effect that Swiss policy on Tibetan refugees has had on their relations with Peking.

2. The rather strong Chinese reaction to Swiss efforts in this regard may have been due partly to the fact that 5 lamas were involved (thus exposing the Tibetans in Switzerland to "imperialist, anti-Peking" propaganda) and partly to the fact that the cultural revolution was then at its height and the Red Guards who had temporarily assumed control of the Chinese foreign ministry were looking under every stone for excuses to attack foreign governments. Our initial reaction to all this is to maintain our view that there is comparatively little political risk involved in terms of our "relations" with Peking in a limited project of Tibetan immigration. We would like however to reserve the right to review this question if and when there appears a more distinct possibility that the pilot project will be put into effect.


3. We have sent copies of this telegram to the various government departments concerned and to Washington, Paris, NY, Delhi, Hongkong and Geneva.

BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE
MICROFILM ORIGINAL

Far Eastern Division

File
Diary
Circulation
Mr. Rogers

Far Eastern Division



file
DM

MR. ARNOLD SMITH

CONFIDENTIAL

(through United Nations Division)

Nov. 13, 1964

FAR EASTERN DIVISION

Your memorandum of November 6

Commentary for the Nineteenth UNGA

Attached is a brief on the Question of Tibet for inclusion in the Commentary for the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

P. A. McDONNELL

Far Eastern Division

sent

Commentary

The Question of Tibet

a) Background References

General Assembly Resolutions

1358 (XIV) The Question of Tibet

General Assembly Document

A/4444, August 19, 1960 - Request for Inscription of Tibetan Item on the Agenda of the Fifteenth Session (Malaya and Thailand)

General Committee

127th Meeting, September 22, 1960. Official Records of the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

General Assembly Records

A/PV/1084-1085 Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records, Sixteenth General Assembly

Departmental Document

September 19, 1962 - Part II Commentary on The Question of Tibet

General Assembly Document

A/5765 - Request for Inscription of Tibetan item on the Agenda of the Nineteenth Session (El Salvador, Nicaragua and Philippines)

b) Issues Facing the Session

1. The question of Tibet has not been discussed in the General Assembly since the sixteenth session. The issue most likely to be raised this year in the General Committee in connection with the question of Tibet is whether or not the Assembly should be precluded from discussing the question under Article 2 (7) of the Charter. For those countries, including Canada, which accept that the United Nations General Assembly has the right and is competent to consider a question of this nature, the issues involved are the human rights and freedoms of the Tibetan people, especially their cultural, religious and civil liberties and their right to self-determination.

2. In previous sessions, the issues of the international status of Tibet, Chinese claims to sovereignty over Tibet, and international intervention and investigation were avoided primarily because those nations which were disturbed by events in Tibet considered that the United Nations had no means of taking effective action. This year, these issues will probably be avoided again for the same reason.

c) Likely Course of Events and Attitudes of Interested Parties

3. The Assembly may have to deal with a resolution of the type adopted at the sixteenth session calling for respect for the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the

Tibetan people (including the right of self-determination) or, as was the case at the fifteenth session, a debate on inscription of the question of Tibet may take place in the General Committee without proceeding to consideration of a resolution on the substance of the question in plenary session.

4. In past debates on the Tibetan question all speakers, with the exception of those from the Soviet bloc, have deplored with varying degrees of intensity the actions of the Chinese Communists in Tibet. Nevertheless, nearly one-third of the membership, including France, South Africa, and many of the Africans and Asians have abstained when voting on draft resolutions for one or more of the following reasons:

- (i) reasonable doubt regarding the status of Tibet and therefore the competence of the United Nations to pronounce on the issue;
- (ii) lack of a solution to the problem of Chinese representation;
- (iii) the doubtful effectiveness of the debate and of the draft resolutions on either the lessening of tension or the protection of the interests of the Tibetans.

5. Although the sponsors of resolutions on the question of Tibet at the fourteenth and sixteenth sessions succeeded in having the resolutions passed, there was decreasing

enthusiasm for debate on this subject. Attitudes and positions adopted at the fourteenth session remained virtually unchanged. The Soviet bloc voted solidly against inscription and against resolutions, while just over half the United Nations membership, including Canada, voted for both.

6. Smaller anti-communist countries (Malaysia, Ireland, El Salvador, Thailand, Nicaragua, Philippines, etc.): These countries have in the past stressed the duty of the United Nations to take note of and condemn violations of human rights whether or not the matter is one of internal jurisdiction. They can be expected to argue along the same lines at the nineteenth session.

7. Soviet Bloc: The Soviet Union and its allies have consistently presented three main arguments:

- (i) the Tibetan question has been introduced for obstructionist and cold war purposes;
- (ii) because Tibet is an inalienable part of China, the General Assembly is not competent to deal with the question, under Article 2 (7) of the Charter;
- (iii) Chinese activities in Tibet have been directed at the removal of an unjust social system and the introduction of "democratic reforms".

8. Uncommitted countries: Most of these countries have in the past based their doubts about the propriety or value of Assembly action on the grounds listed in paragraph 4 above.

9. Some Western countries have abstained on the grounds that the Assembly is not competent to discuss the issue under Article 2 (7). These countries have included France, Britain, Spain, South Africa, Belgium and Portugal, although in some cases such as Britain and Belgium, they have voted in favour of inscription of the item on the agenda. At the sixteenth session, Britain and Belgium voted for the resolution while Spain and Portugal were absent when the vote was taken. No change in these attitudes is likely this year, except that there will probably be even less enthusiasm for a debate on Tibet than there has been in the past.

d) Policy Considerations Involved for Canada

10. Canadian opinion was disturbed by the events in Tibet. For that reason the Canadian Delegation to the fourteenth session worked for and supported a resolution condemning Chinese Communist action in Tibet on the basis of a violation of human rights. The Canadian Delegation thought that the principal danger to be avoided was a situation in which most of China's neighbours would oppose any resolution and thus in effect condone China's actions. In order to avoid this, it considered that the resolution should be moderate, emphasize human rights

and avoid political judgments about the international status of Tibet. Similar considerations motivated subsequent Canadian votes for either inscription of the Tibetan question on the agenda or resolutions on the question. Although we had some doubts about the wisdom of including references to the Tibetan people's right to self-determination in the resolution at the sixteenth session, we supported the draft resolution when it came to a vote because we had always agreed on the desirability of focusing world opinion in the United Nations on the Tibetan problem; because we have emphasized the applicability of the principle of self-determination to the people of Formosa and to others; and because the sponsors of the draft resolution (particularly, that year, Malaya and Ireland with which our relations at the United Nations had been especially close) were clearly counting on our support.

11. An additional consideration at this session, in connection with the debate on Chinese representation which will probably reveal an erosion of support for the U.S. position on China, is that it would be undesirable if a similar erosion of support were to take place on the question of Tibet, thus giving an impression of growing isolation of the U.S.A. For this and the above reasons, it seems desirable to maintain the Canadian attitude outlined in paragraph 10 above. As regards the contents of the resolution, we would hope for a resolution

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Aid and Development Division

CONFIDENTIAL

Far Eastern Division

May 5, 1969.

Commonwealth Division Memorandum of May 2

Rehabilitation of Tibetan Refugees

20 - TIBET	
41	/

Commonwealth
Division

We would certainly not wish the forthcoming discussions with the Chinese on the establishment of diplomatic relations to stand in the way of our giving assistance for the rehabilitation and resettlement of Tibetan refugees. When it comes to publicity, however, we are strongly in favour of doing good by stealth in this instance, and endorse the comments in paragraph 18 of New Delhi's letter 317 of April 15.

2. The Chinese are extremely sensitive about the policies of other countries towards Tibet, and particularly resent any statement or action tending to give legitimacy to the status of the Dalai Lama as head of a Tibetan government-in-exile. We therefore hope that while our discussions with the Chinese are going on, publicity can be kept to a minimum for any Canadian aid to the Tibetans. We would also appreciate the opportunity to comment upon any publicity that may be given to such a grant before it is released.

J. M. HARRINGTON

Far Eastern Division.

MANIFESTO

Because very little is known about Tibet many people think that it has always been under the domination of China. They are surprised to learn for instance, that the Tibetans have had their own passports, currency etc. and have had direct trade relations with other countries.

If we begin as early as the year 635 A.D., with Tibet's most famous king Songtsen Gampo, we find ample evidence in Tibetan history that it has always been an independent country and never under the dictatorship of China. True, this king had a Chinese and a Nepalese wives, but he obtained them by force, sending soldiers for that express purpose. At that time the borders of Tibet stretched as far as Lanchow in the east to Nepal in the west and included the whole of Sinkiang province in the north. In 712 A.D., we find that King May-Aktsom also procured a Chinese bride, she being offered in order to bribe the Tibetans into peaceful relations on the Chinese border.

During the reign of Tihstsong Detsen (about 741 A.D.) pundits came from India to teach Buddhism. At this time relations were not good between China and Tibet and the former used to pay a yearly tribute of 50,000 pieces of Chinese brocade to Tibet. In 755 A.D. The Chinese stopped this tribute, so the Tibetans attacked China and extended their boundary to Shensi province. The then ruling emperor of China fled the country and the Tibetans enthroned an Emperor of their choice.

The year 877 A.D. saw a religious revival and a treaty with China. This treaty concerned the boundary then fixed at Chorten Karpo. (The actual White Chorten giving the place its name is still standing today). The details of the treaty were engraved on three separate pillars, one of which is today in Lhasa, another at Sien (Shensi province) and the third at Chorten Karpo itself. The treaty is written in both Chinese and Tibetan.

In 1244 A.D. the first Lama King of the famous Sakya Lama line began to rule. One of these kings was invited to China by the Emperor, a descendent of the Great Mongolian conqueror Genghis Khan. There he was treated as an independent King; he had a strong religious affinity with the Mongols. The fact that the great Chinese Emperor himself escorted Tibet's King a distance of four month's journey on his return to Tibet, proves that great respect was paid to him.

The friendship of the Third Dalai Lama (in 1578 A.D.) with Altan, king of Mongolia, gained considerable significance when Altan's grandson became the Emperor of China (the first of the Manchurian line) and invited the fifth Dalai Lama to China. On this occasion it is recorded (both by Tibetans and foreigners) that the Chinese ruler escorted the Tibetan King many day's journey on his entry into China. This, together with the fact that the Chinese and Tibetan rulers often conferred honours upon each other, shown the equality of the relationship of the two rulers.

*Sole Chinese have
managed to keep their
independent spirit!*

This visit by the Dalai Lama was also used by the Chinese to their own advantage, since they feared the Mongolians occasional revolts against them who in turn recognised the authority of the Dalai Lama. Any friendship which ever existed between China and Tibet was based upon religion and both the Mongols and Chinese recognised the Dalai Lama as their spiritual Guide.

The scene began to change in 1908 during the reign of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, when the Chinese, under the leadership of Chao-Erh-Feng (known as "the butcher") attacked Tibet. Many monasteries were destroyed and hundreds of people massacred. After the raid the remnants of the forces were sent back to China via India. Since that time (1912) up to 1950 no Chinese have been allowed into Tibet without express permission.

*This clause was
removed in the
Chinese by the
British*

Tibet, independent and peace-loving, has a theocratic form of Government with His Holiness the Dalai Lama as its sole Ruler. Its language, culture, traditions are completely different from those of China. Yet, in the year 1949, when the Communists subdued the whole China, they declared that the whole world through the radio that China wanted to "liberate" Tibet.

The Chinese suddenly attacked the eastern regions of our country from eight different directions. Being a non-violent and peace-loving country, Tibet had no stock of arms and ammunitions, and the legal Government of the country approached the United Nation's General Assembly for justice and to check the further advance of the Chinese invasion. Receiving no reply from that Assembly, we approached the Security Council at its session at Lake Success. To our greatest disappointment both of our appeals were ignored and remain unanswered to this day. It was under these circumstances that the Chinese forced our Governor at Chamdo to submit to their dictates and to make the Government of Lhasa surrender. To the Governor was dictated the so-called "17 point agreement", which he had to translate into Tibetan. Then he was forced to sign it on behalf of the Government of Tibet by the threat of further troops being sent into Tibet if this was not done. No document is legal without the official seal of the Cabinet duly sanctioned by the Dalai Lama, but the Chinese made a seal of their own for the purpose (and this seal is still in their possession); therefore the agreement was never properly signed.

Since that time the Tibetans have suffered untold agonies. The Chinese Communists have gradually deprived us of all our political rights. Our Government, right from the top to the provincial and district offices, has been made powerless and today we are governed completely by the Chinese. Soon after their occupation in 1951 the Chinese organised the Regional Military Commanders and abolished our National Army, and the Commanders and Vice-Commanders of our own forces were enlisted with the Communists forces to bring them into line with the forces of occupation. During 1953-54 the Chinese tried to establish their Military and Political Committee to abolish the Tibetan Government. But the bitter opposition of the people prevented this. By the end of 1954 the Chinese managed to take the Dalai Lama to China and there he was forced to agree and confirm the autonomous status of Tibet submitting to establish the Regional Autonomous Government of Tibet. In 1955 the Dalai Lama

returned to Tibet. In 1956 the Chinese, in order to consolidate their hold on Tibet, formed the preparatory committee of the Regional Autonomous Government of Tibet. This Committee is directly governed by the Peking Government. All its members both Chinese and Tibetans must be approved by the Peking authorities and all its decisions must first be confirmed by them. They have installed their own agents in that Committee with fifty-fifty representation of Chinese and Tibetans, and have used those Tibetan puppets to influence the decisions of the Committee. Thus politically the Tibetans have been made completely subservient to the Chinese over-lords.

Economically Tibet used to be self-sufficient for its food supply. But today millions of Chinese are living on our people and our food situation is desparate. The people in the East and N. East are facing a famine. The Chinese, besides laying hands on our current crops, have forced our people to open our centuries-old granaries. They have also taken away our reserves of gold and silver bullion. In the southern and central regions they have destroyed thousands of acres of agricultural lands by giving priority to "national highways" and to the building of barracks and arsenals. In the East and N. East regions the Chinese have introduced the Communist method of land-reforms. In these areas half the population are peasants and the other half nomads. To effect their land reforms the Chinese have imported masses of their settlers and distributed the agricultural land of the Tibetans among them. They have in this way introduced the collectivisation of farms. In this process the Chinese have made the despoiled Tibetan farmers work twelve hours a day, with daily ration, insufficient for a single meal. In the distribution of property they have not even spared the Tibetans' personal requisites of every-day life such as rugs, rooms in the houses and articles of clothings. Our Tibetans are expected to treat these Chinese settlers as their aunts and uncles, and share all their property equally with the immigrants. The nomads too are victims of these so-called reforms. Their flocks of sheep and cattle, their wool and dairy products are all being confiscated by the alien Government.

In the name of education they have opened schools of various denominations, organised training centres such as "Youth's League", "Women's Association", "Workers' Party"; and they are trying their utmost to enlist as many as possible of our young men and children. In this way they have made thousands of homes unhappy by sending their children to China for the so-called advancement of their education. None of these children are being trained or educated for any constructive purposes. There are no Tibetan engineers, electricians, chemists or doctors. They train our youths to distrust each other. They are trying to indoctrinate the young Tibetans minds and to strengthening the forces of communism in our land. As a result they have divided families: son against father, wife against husband, and thus alienating Tibetans from their own culture, tradition and home-land.

In the matter of religion they have their own schemes to subvert the very bases of Buddha's Teachings. Our religion teaches love for all and malice for none. The Communists in their struggle to spread the Marxist ideology have used our well-known monk scholars to mislead the simple Tibetans. In this endeavour they made Geyshey Sherab Gyatso, one of the well-known monk scholars, propagate their own doctrine by writing pamphlets and translating their various books and articles. They have also used the Panchen Lama as a puppet to advance their political purposes in Tibet. Pamphlets and articles of propaganda have been spread all over Tibet since 1948-1953, and communism is being preached to all our people. In Kumbum (one of the famous monasteries in the east) the Chinese have actually made our head-lamas study Marxist Dialectics. Ordinary monks try to overcome by such material arguments as this: The Monks are made to remain in their cells and try to procure food by prayer alone. If the food is not miraculously produced, this is supposed to prove that God does not exist. Meantime the Communists prevent the monks from using their God-given natural powers to procure food, torture them by hunger into abandoning their simple faith. The Communists preach day in and day out to our simple people and monks that religion is nothing short of an opium to distract the human mind from hard work. They have used hundreds of these monks as labourers in the building of roads and barracks. They have stopped the monasteries from sharing the usual food reserves and thousands of monks starved to death for this reason. They have forced many of our monks to marry and move to China to earn a living. They have laid hands on the capital of these monasteries and even subjected to tax the very idols and statues. Such has been the battle of Marxist Ideology against our spiritual heritage.

Outwardly they are telling people that they have come to Tibet to protect and help the Tibetans and to build roads, hospitals and air-fields. As a matter of fact the roads are being built to connect Tibet with the Chinese mainland in order to transport millions of their armed forces to the far-flung areas of Tibet. In making these thousands of miles of roads they have used Tibetans as forced labourers and thousands of them have died for want of food and proper care. Their hospitals are not meant for these poor victims but are mainly to use for their armed forces. The Tibetans even in the towns are not allowed to use these army hospitals. The big air-fields that they have built are mainly for the purpose of bringing in fuel, arms and ammunitions. Tibetans are not even allowed to pass near those air-fields, guarded so heavily by our oppressor. All these constructions are mainly for the purpose of consolidating their hold on Tibet and to suppress and preserve the conquered land and people of Tibet.

To us Tibetans the phrase "the liberation of Tibet", in its moral and spiritual implications, is based as a deadly mockery. The country of a free people was invaded and occupied under the pretext of liberation... liberation from whom and what? Our was a happy country with solvent Government and a contented people till the Chinese invasion in 1950.

In view of all these facts the Tibetans approached the Chinese to conciliate. But all our efforts went in vain. Instead we are subjected to untold cruelty. The people of eastern Tibet revolted against the Chinese in Feb. 1956. These spontaneous uprisings brought about further repression by the conquerors. They have desecrated religious buildings and destroyed monasteries, razed villages to the ground and killed thousands of our people. They have also used poison gas. Bombs have been thrown on innocent children and women. More than fifteen thousand people have been injured in these battles. Life in all parts of Tibet has become unbearable. So much so that more than thirty thousand people in central Tibet round about Lhasa the capital left their hearth and home to the far-off valleys and gorges. It is feared that trouble may also flare up in these areas. Many places in Kham and Amdo are still scenes of unheaven and turmoil. Our patriots are fighting hard in those areas some of the Amdos who fled to the mountains are still not giving up their fight for freedom, suffering at least a hundred casualties a day.
